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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
In the circumstances above-mentioned, where compliance with the
decree was recognized as impossible unless defendant-appellant either
trespassed upon the lands of another or obtained a license-consent to
enter the same, such peculiarity of language is understandable. But
it seems to suggest that the injunctional decree is itself a rather point-
less appendage, sandwiched between the normal procedures of legal
relief.
The same point is emphasized by the second circumstance. While
the principal case was pending on appeal, another action was brought
to abate the identical dump, but was brought against the City of Mil-
waukee, which had also contributed to the "erection" of the nuisance.
The lower court had, prior to the decision on appeal, granted judgment
in abatement, and had authorized issuance of a warrant to the sheriff
under the provisions of Sec. 280.04, under which, presumably, the
nuisance was in the process of actual abatement. Nothing resembling
an injunctional order in equity attended these proceedings. Granting
that such later-arising circumstances could not properly control the
propriety of the present appeal, the fact does tend to argue rather
strongly against the theory, on the question whether or not the legal
remedy of abatement is an adequate one under the circumstances.
To summarize: If there is a legal remedy in Wisconsin which is
adequate to abate nuisances, and there is every indication that one exists,
then equity should not intervene in such cases. The defendant has
ceased all dumping and has given no cause to fear that he will create
any new nuisance or a recurrence of the old, there is no threat of
interminable litigation or a multiplicity of actions; therefore, the
remedy at law is adequate, and equity should not have assumed jur-
isdiction over appellant in the instant case.
JAMES WILLIAMSON
Conditional Sales-Refiling of Contract on Removal of Goods-
Plaintiff, a corporation in Oklahoma, brought a replevin action to
recover possession of an automobile. Plaintiff had sold a new auto-
mobile employing a conditional sales contract. In the event of any
default in payments, the whole balance became due and payable, and
the plaintiff would be entitled to immediate possession. This contract
was recorded in Oklahoma as required by their law. The buyer made
no payments, and took the car to Texas and subsequently to Cali-
of compulsion and coercion which the common law, like most other legal
systems, has wholly rejected; for when a person is complained of to a court
of equity, the court first ascertains and decides what, if anything, the person
complained of ought to do or refrain from doing; then, by its order or decree,
it commands him to do or refrain from doing what it has decided he ought
to do or refrain from doing; and finally, if he refuses or neglects to obey the
order or decree, it punishes him by imprisonment for his disobedience."
Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARV. L. REV. 111, 116-118.
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fornia. After two month's delinquency in payments, the plaintiff hired
an agent to locate and repossess the car. The agent found the chattel
in the possession of the defendant in Arizona. The defendant had
acquired the car from an apparent sub-purchaser of the conditional
vendee. Within two days the agent demanded possession of the car
after exhibiting an executed copy of the original reservation of title.
Plaintiff failed to file or record a copy of the conditional sales contract
as provided in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, adopted in Arizona.
Held: Where a chattel sold under a conditional sales contract is re-
moved to another filing district or state requiring refiling, the condi-
tional vendor's reservation of title is protected as against the creditors
or purchasers of the conditional vendee who have actual notice of
the contract within ten days after the conditional vendor learns of the
removal of the chattel, even though the conditional vendor fails to
refile the agreement in the filing district to which the chattel was
removed. Frontier Motors, Inc. v. Chick Norton Buick Co., 78 Ariz.
341, 279 P. 2d 1032 (1955).
As a general rule, a contract valid where made is valid everywhere.'
Likewise, the law of the place where the contract was made governs
as to the necessity of refiling, unless contrary to the public policy of the
state to which the property has been removed.2 Those states which
have adopted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act have thereby expressed
a defined public policy. Section 143 of the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act basically provides that unless a conditional seller refiles his reser-
vation of title in the filing district to which the chattel has been removed
within ten days, he shall lose his priority over the creditors or purchasers
of his conditional vendee. Judicial construction has dispelled the con-
fusion as to when goods are "removed" by the buyer, and refiling be-
comes a necessity for the vendor if he is to retain his security interest
in the chattel.4 In Forgan v. Smedal5 the court indicates that the statute
does not contemplate the type of situation where the buyer temporarily
moves the chattel. On the contrary, the refiling requirement operates
only where it is established that there was an intention to change the
permanent situs of the property, and that the vendor has received
notice of the filing district to which the goods have been removed.
1 Varnum v. Camp, 13 N.J.L. 326, 25 Am. Dec. 476 (1833) ; Bentley v. Whitte-
more, 19 N.J.Eq. 462, 97 Am. Dec. 671 (1868) ; Moore v. Bonnell, 31 N.J.L. 90(1864).
2 Bradshaw v. Kleiber Motor Truck Co., 29 Ariz. 293, 241 Pac. 305 (1925);
Thayer Mercantile Co. v. First National Bank of Milltown, 97 N.J. L. 907, 119
At]. 94 (1922) ; Goetschius v. Brightman, 214 App. Div. 158, 211 N.Y.Supp. 763(1925), aff'd, 245 N.Y. 186, 56 N.E. 660 (1927).
3 Uniform Conditional Sales Act §14. (Refiling on Removal.)
4 In re Frank Bowman, 36 F.2d 721 (2nd Cir. 1929) ; Hare & Chase v. Tomkin-
son (N.J. Supp.) 129 Atl. 396 (1925) ; Endler v. Commercial Credit Corp., 105
N.J.L. 474, 144 Atl. 582 (1929).
5 203 Wis. 564, 234 N.W. 896 (1931).
6 Ibid. Also see CIT Corp. v. Guy, 170 Va. 16, 195 S.E. 659 (1938).
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Commenting on the last requirement, the court stated in Confidential
Loan & Mortgage Co. v. Hardgrove7 that:
Under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, the assignee of the
vendor of the machine is not required to follow the daily travel-
ing of the one using the machine and file notice wherever and
whenever it happens to stop.
However, it would seem that notice to the seller of the removal of the
property, primarily an evidentiary issue, is sufficient if it apprises the
seller of the removal of the property, whether it be written or not.,
By way of contrast to the requirement of refiling expressed in the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, it is interesting to note that in a recent
Wisconsin decision9 it was held that refiling of a chattel mortgage is
not necessary when the goods are removed from the county in which
they were located when the chattel mortgage was first recorded.
The Frontier Motors case, now under consideration, brings to light
another problem which has evolved from the operation of section 14.
Simply stated, the issue is whether personal notice to the creditors or
purchasers of the conditional vendee eliminates the necessity of refiling
the reservation of title within ten days after the conditional vendor
learns of the removal of the property. Although section 14 is intended
to be uniform throughout the jurisdictions which adopt it, judicial
construction of the effect and purpose of the refiling requirement has
driven a wedge into the desired effect of uniformity.
The Frontier Motors decision leaves no room for doubt that Ari-
zona adopts the position held by West Virginia and New York, that
personal or actual notice to the creditors or purchasers of the buyer
within the ten day period dispenses with the refiling requirement when
goods are removed to another filing district. In Banks-Miller Supply
Co. v. Bank of Marlinton,10 the plaintiff sold certain machinery under
a conditional sales contract, which was regularly recorded in the
county where the sale occurred. The buyer subsequently removed the
goods to another county, payments still being incomplete under the
contract. The buyer became indebted to the defendant, who instituted
suit against the buyer, in which suit the machinery was attached, sold,
and purchased by the defendant. The plaintiff seller notified the de-
fendant by letter dated only one day after the plaintiff learned of the
removal. In a suit to recover the machinery, the court held that the
mere removal of the goods to another county does not in itself affect
the seller's reservation of title, but that the seller mentioned in section
14 can lose his priorities only by his own indifference to the provisions
7259 Wis. 346,48 N.W.2d 466 (1951).
s In re Frank Bowman, 36 F.2d 721 (2nd Cir. 1929).
9 Peterson Cutting Dye Co. v. Bach Sales Co., 269 Wis. 113, 68 N.W.2d 804
(1955). Also see Bailey v. Costello, 94 Wis. 87, 68 N.W. 663 (1896).
19 106 W.Va. 583, 146 S.E. 521 (1929).
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of the statute, and not by the act of the buyer or the buyer's creditors.
The primary reasoning of the West Virginia court is:"
Recordation of such a contract is designed to give notice, con-
structive or actual. If the party to be affected has actual notice,
the very purpose of recordation is served. (Cites cases.) Where
the claims of creditors to removed property attach prior to the
notice to the seller required by section 14 ... or where creditors
have actual notice of the seller's rights . . . subsequent record-
ation would be futile .... The statute does not require of the
seller the performance of a -vain act.
The Banks-Miller case indicates that recordation as provided for
in section 14 may not be necessary in certain cases. Closely allied to
this spirit of interpretation, the state of New York in Hartford Accept-
ance Corp. v. Kirchheimer 2 held that where the conditional seller
succeeded in retaking possession of the chattel within the ten day
period after learning of the removal of the goods, there would seem
to be no reason for the filing prescribed in section 14, since possession
and title of the chattel are in the same person-recordation being
intended to inform the public that title is in one person while posses-
sion is in another.
Although the reasoning of West Virginia and New York seems to
rest on a firm, logical foundation, section 14 has been construed by
other jurisdictions emphatically to require filing. In a Wisconsin deci-
sion, Universal Credit Co. v. Finn,3 where a truck sold in Illinois
under a conditional sales contract was removed to Wisconsin and
attached by a creditor of the buyer, the court held that even though
the attaching creditor had received actual notice within ten days after
the seller first learned of the removal, since the seller did not file a
copy of the contract in the county in which the truck was located, the
vendor's reservation of title was void as against the attaching creditor.
In construing section 122.14 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 4 which is the
same as section 14, the court states :'5
There is nothing in the act which provides that if the purchaser
or attaching creditor without notice, thereafter and during the
ten-day period in which the seller is required to file his con-
tract, receives notice of the provision of the contract reserving
property in the seller, that his purchase or attachment thereby
becomes invalid as against the seller. Had the commissioners
who drafted the act intended so to provide, it would have been
a simple matter to have inserted such exception in the law.
The same conclusion was reached in Thayer Mercantile Co. v. First
31146 S.E. at p. 522.
12 166 Misc. 219, 2 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1938).
13212 Wis. 601, 250 N.W. 391 (1935). Also see Bradshaw v. Kleiber Motor Truck
Co., 29 Ariz. 293, 241 Pac. 305 (1925).
14 Wis. Stats. (1953) §122.14.
15 Supra, note 13, 212 Wis. at p. 607, 250 N.W. at p. 393.
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National Bank of Milltown 6 in New Jersey in 1922. It was held
that even though the common law of New York, in this instance the
law of the forum, provides that the rights of the conditional vendor
are superior to an attaching creditor of the buyer, when the chattel
is removed to New Jersey the seller loses his superiority if he fails to
file a copy of the contract, since section 14 clearly defines the policy
of the state of the rei sitae.
The above case illustrations indicate that the uniformity of section
14 has been broken down among the states that have adopted the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act. In the face of the current upsurge
of sales transactions employing the conditional sales contract as a
security device, the split of interpretation, highlighted by the Frontier
Motors decision of Arizona, becomes an important issue in the law of
sales. In the Universal Credit Co.'7 case, Wisconsin rests its decision
on their interpretation of the purpose of section 14 as it existed in
the minds of those who drafted it, that is, to clarify the field of deci-
sions and the resulting conflicts among the states by placing upon the
seller the slight burden of refiling the contract in the place where the
removed chattel is located.'8 Unfortunately, the use of the recording
device to achieve this end was destined to meet with various con-
structions. For instance, Wisconsin has stated that the purpose of
requiring recording or filing of a conditional sales contract is to
furnish information as to title and to protect bona fide purchasers-
in other words, to protect those dealing with the possessor of personal
property against secret trusts or claims of others having no connection
with possession and no apparent connection with title.' 9 It is difficult
to see how an extension of this principle would not lead to the con-
clusion reached in Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Bank of Marlinton20
that recordation is a vain thing when the person to be protected already
knows of the lien or claim of the other party.
In the opinion of the writer, however, the position maintained by
Wisconsin in the Universal Credit Co. 21 decision correctly considers
the type of purchaser and creditor contemplated by section 14, and in
so doing, achieves the desired construction of the statute. By express
reference to section 5,22 the statute in effect prescribes the refiling of
16 98 N.J.L. 907, 119 Atl. 94 (1922).
17 Supra, note 13.
is See 2 Uniform Laws Annotated, Conditional Sales 24. "If a uniform law with
respect to conditional sales were adopted, and this law provided for the refiling
of the contract upon removal of the goods, the difficulties illustrated by these
cases would be avoided. A slight extra burden would be placed upon the seller
in refiling the contract, but much litigation and loss on the part of the innocent
public would be prevented."
19 New Dells Lumber Co. v. Pfiffner, 216 Wis. 638, 258 N.W. 375 (1935).
2o0Supra, note 10.
21 Supra, note 13.
22 Uniform Conditional Sales Act §5; Wis. Stats. (1953) §122.05(1). Every
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the reservation of title within ten days after the seller learns of the
removal, or else such reservation is void as against "any purchaser
from or creditor of the buyer, who, without notice of such provision,
purchases the goods or acquires by attachment or levy a lien upon
them.. . ." (italics added). 23 It seems clear therefore that as against
one who does have actual notice prior to the purchase or attachment,
the refiling of the contract is not necessary. If, on the other hand,
actual notice is received after the attachment or purchase, then re-
filing within ten days is essential to preserve the seller's security
interest. 24 To hold otherwise, as in the Frontier Motors case, that
actual or personal notice is sufficient, ignores the clear distinction con-
tained in section 5 between creditors and purchasers who have notice
before the purchase or attachment, and those who do not. It is also
important to note that a conditional vendor has a decided advantage
even in the case where the creditor or purchaser did not have notice
when he made the attachment or the purchase. Section 14 gives the
seller ten days after he first learns of the removal in which merely
by filing the reservation of title, he may secure a priority over the
innocent creditor or purchaser. Thus, bearing in mind that the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act purports to protect the bona fide purchaser
and others from secret liens and hidden claims,25 it seems essential
to limit the means available to the conditional vendor to retain his
superior security interest as against purchasers or creditors who did
not have notice when they acted, by strictly construing the statute
to require filing or recording of the seller's reservation of title.
RIcnrmw J. AsH
Admissibility of Patients' Statement of Past Pain and Suffering
Made to a Physician for the Purpose of Securing Treatment-
Plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries arising out of an
intersection collision. Prior to any contemplated suit, plaintiff sought
and received the professional services of a physician. The trial court
provision in a conditional sale reserving property in the seller shall be void as
to any purchaser from or creditor of the buyer, who, without notice of
such provision, purchases the goods or acquires by attachment or levy a lien
upon them, before the contract or a copy thereof shall be filed as hereinafter
provided, unless such contract or copy is so filed within ten days after the mak-
ing of the conditional sale.
23 Ibid.
24 An interesting issue is raised in the case where the seller does prevail under
section 14 and seeks damages instead of recovery of possession. Although the
issue is an important one as far as the parties go, few courts have discussed
the problem. In the Frontier Motors case, however, the court pointed out that
the correct measure of damages is that the vendor is entitled to recover the
amount of his special interest, i.e., the unpaid balance under the contract plus
incidental expenses, or the value of the chattel at the time of trial, whichever
of the two is the lesser amount.2 5Supra, note 19.
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